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Abstract
In the Prophet Secretary problem, samples from a known set of probability distributions
arrive one by one in a uniformly random order, and an algorithm must irrevocably pick one of
the samples as soon as it arrives. The goal is to maximize the expected value of the sample
picked relative to the expected maximum of the distributions. This is one of the most simple
and fundamental problems in online decision making that models the process selling one item to
a sequence of costumers. For a closely related problem called the Prophet Inequality where the
order of the random variables is adversarial, it is known that one can achieve in expectation 1/2
of the expected maximum, and no better ratio is possible. For the Prophet Secretary problem,
that is, when the variables arrive in a random order, Esfandiari et al. [7] showed that one can
actually get 1− 1/e of the maximum. The 1− 1/e bound was recently extended to more general
settings [6]. Given these results, one might be tempted to believe that 1 − 1/e is the correct
bound. We show that this is not the case by providing an algorithm for the Prophet Secretary
problem that beats the 1− 1/e bound and achieves 1− 1/e+ 1/400 of the optimum value. We
also prove a hardness result on the performance of algorithms under a natural restriction which
we call deterministic distribution-insensitivity.
1 Introduction
The Prophet Inequality problem of Krengel and Sucheston [12, 13] is one of the cornerstones in
optimal stopping theory. In this problem, probability distributions of a sequence X1, . . . ,Xn of
independent non-negative random variables is given to an algorithm. Thereafter, samples x1 ∼
X1, . . . , xn ∼ Xn are revealed to the algorithm one by one, and the algorithm is required to pick (at
most) one of the xi’s irrevocably as soon as it is revealed. The goal of the algorithm is to maximize
its profit, that is, the value of the sample that it picks. It is easy to see that we may only look for
threshold algorithms, that is, algorithms which come up with a threshold αi in each round i, and
accept xi if and only if xi ≥ αi.
The primary motivation behind studying the Prophet Inequality and its related problems comes
from mechanism design. Consider a single-item auction where customers arrive online, and the item
is to be sold irrevocably to one of the customers. Suppose that the probability distribution of the
valuation of each customer is known in advance. A threshold algorithm naturally translates to a
posted price mechanism, which is inherently truthful, and the goal of maximizing the sample picked
translates to maximizing the social welfare.
Indeed, if the algorithm knew all the samples x1, . . . , xn in advance, it would pick maxi xi,
resulting in an expected profit of E[maxiXi]. The algorithm’s performance is, therefore, compared
against the benchmark of E[maxiXi]. An algorithm is said to have a competitive ratio of c if its
∗This work was done when the author was a post-doc at Tel Aviv University.
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expected profit is at least c · E[maxiXi], on any sequence X1, . . . ,Xn of random variables. The
classical results of Krengel and Sucheston [12, 13] state that (1/2)-competitive algorithms exist,
and no algorithm can have a better competitive ratio. One such (1/2)-competitive algorithm is the
following simple algorithm by Kleinberg and Weinberg [11]: compute T = E[maxiXi]/2, and pick
the first xi which exceeds T , if one exists.
Another well known problem in the domain of optimal stopping is the Secretary problem [5, 8],
where a set of values {x1, . . . xn} is chosen adversarially, and revealed to an algorithm in a random
order. As before, an algorithm has to pick one of the xi’s as soon as it is revealed. Inspired from
this problem, Esfandiari, Hajiaghayi, Liaghat, and Monemizadeh [7] defined a natural variant of
the Prophet Inequality problem called the Prophet Secretary problem. Here, the set {X1, . . . ,Xn}
of random variables is adversarial and known to the algorithm in advance, whereas the samples
{xi ∼ Xi} are revealed in a uniformly random order. Since the order is no longer adversarial, it is
natural to expect that algorithms with competitive ratio larger than 1/2 will exist. Esfandiari et al.
gave an algorithm which does the following. The algorithm chooses a sequence 1 > α1 > · · · > αn >
0 of thresholds determined completely by n and independent of the set of distributions. Suppose
σ ∈ Sn is the random order in which the samples are revealed, that is, the k
th sample to be revealed
is xσ(k). Then the algorithm picks xσ(k) for the smallest k such that xσ(k) ≥ αk ·E[maxiXi], if such
an index k exists, otherwise it picks nothing. Esfandiari et al. proved that, for a suitable choice of
thresholds α1, . . . , αn, the algorithm is (1− 1/e)-competitive.
As an impossibility result, Esfandiari et al. [7] also proved that no algorithm for the prophet
secretary problem can have a competitive ratio better than 3/4. However, observe that the com-
petitive ratio in the particular case where X1, . . . ,Xn are identical and independent is trivially an
upper bound on the competitive ratio of the Prophet Secretary problem. Moreover, if X1, . . . ,Xn
are identical, then the Prophet Inequality and the Prophet Secretary problems are equivalent. Hill
and Kertz [10] had already proved that the competitive ratio for IID Prophet Inequality, which we
call ciid, is at most (1.341)
−1 ≈ 0.746. No upper bound better than ciid is known for the Prophet
Secretary problem.
1.1 Our results
Our main result is that the (algorithmic) lower bound of 1−1/e on the competitive ratio of Prophet
Secretary by Esfandiari et al. [7] is not tight. By introducing new techniques in addition to those
of Esfandiari et al., we give an algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem that has a competitive
ratio better than 1− 1/e. (It is noteworthy that, in contrast to Abolhassani et al. [1] who beat the
1 − 1/e bound only by allowing the algorithm to choose the arrival order of random variables, we
beat the bound for random arrival order.)
Theorem 1. There is an algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem with competitive ratio larger
than 1− 1/e + 1/400.
Observe that the algorithms for the Prophet Inequality problem as well as the Prophet Secretary
problem which we stated previously are both simple in the following sense. Both algorithms are
actually oblivious to the probability distributions ofX1, . . . ,Xn, they only need to know E[maxiXi],
which they compete against. Moreover, both algorithms choose their threshold(s) deterministically.
We call such algorithms deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithms. Our second result is a
hardness result for deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithms.
Theorem 2. Deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithms for the Prophet Secretary problem
cannot have a competitive ratio larger than 11/15 ≈ 0.733.
2
This improves the upper bound of 3/4 by Esfandiari et al. [7], as well as the better upper bound
of ciid ≈ 0.746 due to Hill and Kertz [10], for deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithms.
1.2 Our techniques
We give here the high-level ideas behind the design of our algorithm for the Prophet Secretary
problem. Recall that E[maxiXi] =
∫∞
0 Pr[maxiXi ≥ x]dx, and imagine that every interval I ⊆ R
contributes the value
∫
x∈I Pr[maxiXi ≥ x]dx to E[maxiXi]. We divide the Prophet Secretary
instances into three categories as follows. Loosely speaking, the first category contains instances
in which the contribution of the interval [0, 1 − 1/e] to E[maxiXi] is small. The second category
contains instances in which, in expectation, more than one Xi’s exceed a certain threshold. For each
of these categories, we strengthen Esfandiari et al.’s algorithm to achieve a better performance.
The third category is most interesting and includes all the remaining instances. For these
instances we prove that one of the Xi’s (say X1) is larger than all the rest with high probability,
and also has a sufficiently large expectation. For these instances, our algorithm sets the same
threshold for all samples. We prove that with high probability, the algorithm does not pick a
sample before it encounters X1. As a consequence, it extracts most of the expected value of X1
as its profit. Moreover, the algorithm encounters, on an average, half of the other Xi’s before it
sees X1, because the samples arrive in a uniformly random order. Thus, even in the unlikely event
that one of the Xi’s (i > 1) exceeds the threshold, the algorithm extracts its value with probability
close to 1/2. (This is necessary because E[X1], although large, is not guaranteed to be sufficient by
itself for the algorithm to achieve its targeted competitive ratio.)
1.3 Related Work
Prophet Inequalities (worst case arrival order): Ever since the seminal work of Krengel and
Sucheston [12, 13], the Prophet Inequality problem has been studied in a variety of settings. One of
the most natural variants is perhaps the multiple choice Prophet Inequality, where the algorithm is
required to pick at most k of the xi’s (k > 1), and has to compete against the expectation of the sum
of the k largest random variables. Alaei [2] gave an algorithm for this problem with competitive
ratio 1 − O(k−1/2), which is known to be asymptotically optimal. Kleinberg and Weinberg [11]
considered the Matroid Prophet Inequality problem, where the feasible subsets of random variables
are independent sets of a given matroid. They gave a (1/2)-competitive algorithm even for this
more general problem than the classical Prophet Inequality problem. Going beyond this, Prophet
Inequalities where the feasibility constraint is an intersection of matroids [11], or even an arbitrary
downward-closed set system [14, 15], have been studied.
IID Prophet Inequalities: The case of identical distributions is particularly interesting because
in this setting, the Prophet Inequality and the Prophet Secretary problems coincide. Already more
than two decades ago, Hill and Kertz [10] gave an implicit characterization of ciid, the competitive
ratio for identical distributions, by analyzing the natural dynamic programming algorithm which
performs optimally on every instance. However, they could only find the numerical value of ciid(n),
the competitive ratio when we have n independent identical random variables, for all n ≤ 10000.
They conjectured that ciid(n) decreases as n increases, and proved that for n = 10000, the com-
petitive ratio is approximately (1.341)−1 ≈ 0.746. For n > 10000, they could only prove a lower
bound of 1−1/e on ciid(n). Only recently, Abolhassani et al. [1] improved the lower bound for large
n to 0.738 by giving a new algorithm. Shortly thereafter, Correa, Foncea, Hoeksma, Oosterwijk,
and Vredeveld [4] took an entirely new approach to the problem and came up with yet another
algorithm. They proved that its competitive ratio is at least ccfhov > 0.745, a constant which they
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defined implicitly. Surprisingly, Hill and Kertz’s implicit characterization of ciid and Correa et al’s
implicit definition of ccfhov, although quite different from their appearance, are actually the same.
This means that ciid = ccfhov ∈ [0.745, 0.746], and that the algorithm of Correa et al. [4], in fact,
achieves the optimal competitive ratio. Correa et al. have made this remark already, and we give
the explicit proof in Appendix B.
Best case arrival order: A natural variant of the Prophet Inequality and the Prophet Secretary
problems is the one where the order in which the samples are revealed is chosen by the algorithm
(the best order case). Yan [16] gave a (1−1/e)-competitive algorithm for the best case arrival order
problem. Esfandiari et al. [7] proved that this bound holds even if the arrival order is random, as
stated earlier, which suggests that the best case competitive ratio might be substantially better.
Pursuing this line of research, Abolhassani et al. [1] proved that as long as there are sufficiently
many (independent) copies of each random variable, an algorithm can come up with an appropriate
order for which the competitive ratio is arbitrarily close to ciid.
1 In the absence of the multiplicity
assumption, it is not known whether we can attain a competitive ratio for the best order case which
is better than the random order case.
Matroid Prophet Secretary: Very recently, Ehsani, Hajiaghayi, Kesselheim, and Singla [6]
have considered the generalization of Prophet Secretary to matroids, analogous to Kleinberg and
Weinberg’s generalization of Prophet Inequality to matroids. Ehsani et al. give an algorithm that
achieves the 1− 1/e bound even with matroid feasibility constraint.
Posted price mechanism design: As remarked earlier, algorithms for problems like the Prophet
Inequality and Prophet Secretary correspond to posted price mechanisms for approximately max-
imizing social welfare. A parallel line of work has been to design posted price mechanisms under
similar settings for approximate revenue maximization, taking as benchmark the revenue obtained
by Myerson’s mechanism. For more information on posted price mechanisms for online arrival of
buyers, see [9, 3, 2, 4], and the references therein.
1.4 Organization of the paper
Towards proving Theorem 1, we introduce some notation in Section 2. Since we reuse some part of
Esfandiari et al.’s proof, we give an overview of that proof in Section 3. We present our algorithm
in Section 4, and its analysis in the subsequent subsections, thereby proving Theorem 1. We devote
Section 5 to prove Theorem 2, where we give an adversarial strategy to defeat every distribution-
insensitive algorithm.
2 Preliminaries
Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent non-negative random variables and let X = maxiXi. By scaling
the random variables appropriately, we assume E[X] = 1 without loss of generality throughout this
paper.
In the Prophet Secretary problem, the following interaction takes place between an adversary
ADV, an algorithm ALG, and a third player, say RAND, responsible for all the randomness. (We
abuse notation and also denote the expected profit of the algorithm by ALG.)
1. ADV declares a set X1, . . . ,Xn of independent non-negative random variables such that
E[maxiXi] = 1. (More specifically, ADV reveals the distribution functions of the random
variables.)
1In fact, this claim holds even in the random order case, where O(log n) multiplicity is sufficient. If the algorithm
is allowed to choose the order, even O(1) multiplicity is sufficient.
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2. RAND samples a permutation σ ∈ Sn over the indices {1, . . . , n} uniformly at random and
keeps it private.
3. For k = 1 to n,
(a) ALG declares a threshold αk.
(b) RAND samples xσ(k) ∼ Xσ(k). If xσ(k) ≥ αk, then the ALG is given the profit xσ(k) and
the loop breaks.
Note that in the above setting, we assume that the algorithm does not know σ, and it does not
know xσ(k) even if it rejects xσ(k).
In the more restricted setting of the Distribution-Insensitive Prophet Secretary problem, ADV,
instead of making the random variables X1, . . . ,Xn public, sends them to RAND only. Thus,
the algorithm only knows that E[maxiXi] is one. The thresholds α1, . . . , αn chosen by the al-
gorithm are thus determined solely by n, and are oblivious to the probability distributions of
X1, . . . ,Xn. Moreover, if an algorithm chooses α1, . . . , αn deterministically, we call it a determin-
istic distribution-insensitive algorithm. The (1− 1/e)-competitive algorithm of Esfandiari et al. [7]
is a deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithm. In contrast, the algorithm that we design is
sensitive to the distributions of X1, . . . ,Xn.
3 Overview of the old analysis
We briefly restate those parts of the analysis by Esfandiari et al. which we require in our proof.
Let α1, . . . , αn be the thresholds chosen by an algorithm. Let the random variable zk denote the
profit obtained by the algorithm from the kth round. That is, zk is equal to xσ(k) if the algorithm
picked xσ(k), the k
th sample; otherwise zk is zero. Then
ALG =
n∑
k=1
E[zk] =
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx =
n∑
k=1
∫ αk
0
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx+
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx. (1)
The two terms in the last expression above are bounded from below as follows. Let θ(k) denote
the probability that the algorithm does not choose a value from the first k samples. Let αn+1 = 0.
Then we have,
Proposition 1 (Lemma 10 of [7]).
n∑
k=1
∫ αk
0
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx =
n∑
k=1
(1− θ(k))(αk − αk+1) = α1 −
n∑
k=1
θ(k)(αk − αk+1)
Proposition 2 (Lemma 11 of [7]). Pr[zk ≥ x] ≥
θ(k)
n Pr[X ≥ x] for x ≥ αk, and∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx ≥
θ(k)
n
(
1−
∫ αk
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx
)
≥
θ(k)
n
· (1− αk).
Substituting these bounds into (1), we get a lower bound on ALG which depends on the θ(k)’s.
Esfandiari et al. carefully choose the thresholds α1, . . . , αn in such a way that this dependence is
eliminated, and α1 ≈ 1− 1/e is a lower bound on ALG, and hence, on the competitive ratio.
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4 The improved Algorithm
The main intuition behind our Prophet Secretary algorithm is the following. Suppose that the set
{X1, . . . ,Xn} of random variables is such that for some a and c, the average value of Pr[X ≥ x] over
x ∈ [0, a] is at most c < 1. Then we can use this to strengthen Proposition 2. Next, suppose that
for some T , b, and d,
∑
i Pr[Xi ≥ x] is at least b and
∫∞
T Pr[X ≥ x]dx = d. Then we also exploit
this to strengthen Proposition 2. In either case, we improve the competitive ratio. However, there
exist instances in which none of these improvements is possible. We prove that such instances must
have one of the Xi’s that is bounded away from zero with high probability, while the rest are close
to zero with high probability. In this case, we prove that using a uniform threshold for all samples
suffices.
Our improved algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem has the following four parameters:
a ∈ [0, 1 − 1/e], b > 1, c ∈ [0, 1], and d ∈ [0, 1], chosen such that
ac+ d > 1. (2)
These are absolute constants independent of n and the distributions of the random variables, and
their values will be fixed later. Let T be such that
∫∞
T Pr[X ≥ x]dx = d, or equivalently,
∫ T
0 Pr[X ≥
x]dx = 1 − d, because we assumed that E[X] =
∫∞
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx = 1. Since Pr[X ≥ x] ≤ 1, this
implies the following lower bound on T .
T ≥
∫ T
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx = 1− d. (3)
The thresholds α1, . . . , αn of the algorithm are determined as follows.
• Case 1: If
∫ a
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx ≤ c · a, then
αk =
{
1− e(k−1)/n−1 if k−1n > 1 + ln(1− a),
1
c −
(
1
c − a
) (
e(k−1)/n−1
(1−a)
)c
otherwise.
• Case 2: else if
∑n
i=1 Pr[Xi ≥ T ] ≥ b, then
αk =
{
(1− eb((k−1)/n−1)) · b+d−bdb if
k−1
n > 1−
1
b ln
b+d−bd
d ,
1− d ·
(
b+d−bd
d
)1/b
· e(k−1)/n−1 otherwise.
• Case 3: else α1 = · · · = αn = T .
Our analyses of Case 1 and Case 2 reuse some parts of the analysis by [7], whereas the analysis of
Case 3 uses novel approach. We present the analyses of the three cases in the upcoming subsections,
and then choose our parameters to get the final bound on the competitive ratio.
4.1 Analysis of Case 1
Suppose that the input set of distributions falls into Case 1, that is,
∫ a
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx ≤ c · a. Using
this upper bound on
∫ a
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx, we get the following strengthened version of Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. If k−1n ≤ 1 + ln(1− a) then
∫∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx ≥
θ(k)
n · (1− cαk).
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Proof. From the later part of Proposition 2, we have,∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx ≥
θ(k)
n
(
1−
∫ αk
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx
)
. (4)
Suppose (k − 1)/n ≤ 1 + ln(1− a). From the definition of αk in Case 1 of the algorithm, it is clear
that αk ≥ a. Thus, for any x ≥ 0, ax/αk ≤ x, and hence, Pr[X ≥ x] ≤ Pr[X ≥ ax/αk]. Therefore,∫ αk
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx ≤
∫ αk
0
Pr
[
X ≥
ax
αk
]
dx =
αk
a
∫ a
0
Pr[X ≥ y]dy ≤
αk
a
· ca = cαk
where we get the first equality with the substitution y = ax/αk and the second last inequality follows
from the assumption that we apply Case 1. Substituting this upper bound on
∫ αk
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx in
(4), the claim follows.
Using Lemma 1 to bound
∫∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx for positions k such that (k − 1)/n ≤ 1 + ln(1− a),
and Proposition 2 for positions k such that (k − 1)/n > 1 + ln(1 − a), we get a stronger lower
bound on
∑n
k=1
∫∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx than what is obtained by using Proposition 2 alone. Adding to
this the bound on
∑n
k=1
∫ αk
0 Pr[zk ≥ x]dx given by Proposition 1, we get a lower bound on ALG
that depends on the θ(k)’s. Our choice of the values of αk’s reduces this dependence to an O(n
−1)
error term, and we get the following bound on the competitive ratio, whose proof is deferred to
Appendix A.1.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the input set of distributions falls into Case 1 of the algorithm. Then
the algorithm’s expected profit is at least 1c −
(
1
c − a
)
(e(1− a))−c− γ1n , for an absolute constant γ1.
4.2 Analysis of Case 2
Suppose that the input set of distributions falls into Case 2, that is,
∑n
i=1 Pr[Xi ≥ T ] ≥ b. Then∑n
i=1 Pr[Xi ≥ x] ≥ b for all x ≤ T , because each Pr[Xi ≥ x] can only increase as x decreases. This
gives us the following strengthened version of Proposition 2.
Lemma 2. If k−1n ≥ 1−
1
b ln
b+d−bd
d then
∫∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx ≥
θ(k)
n · (b+ d− bd− bαk).
Proof. Suppose k−1n ≥ 1 −
1
b ln
b+d−bd
d . From the definition of αk in Case 2 of the algorithm, it is
clear that αk ≤ 1− d. Thus, from (3), we have αk ≤ 1− d ≤ T . For x ∈ [αk, T ], we have
Pr[zk ≥ x] ≥
θ(k)
n
n∑
i=1
Pr[Xi ≥ x] ≥
θ(k)
n
n∑
i=1
Pr[Xi ≥ T ] ≥ b ·
θ(k)
n
. (5)
Thus, ∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx =
∫ T
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx+
∫ ∞
T
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx
≥
∫ T
αk
b ·
θ(k)
n
dx+
∫ ∞
T
θ(k)
n
Pr[X ≥ x]dx
≥
θ(k)
n
· b · (1− d− αk) +
θ(k)
n
· d
=
θ(k)
n
· (b+ d− bd− bαk).
Here, in the first inequality, we used Equation (5) for the first term and the earlier part of Propo-
sition 2 for the second term. In the second inequality, we used the lower bound (3) on T for the
first term and the definition of T for the second term.
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Analogous to Case 1, using Lemma 2 to bound
∫∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx for positions k such that
(k−1)/n ≥ 1− 1b ln
b+d−bd
d , and Proposition 2 for positions k such that (k−1)/n < 1−
1
b ln
b+d−bd
d ,
we get better bound on
∑n
k=1
∫∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx. Using this bound and Proposition 1, we again get
a bound ALG which depends on the θ(k)’s. As before, the choice of αk’s reduces this dependence
to an O(n−1) error term, and we get the following bound on the competitive ratio, whose proof is
deferred to Appendix A.2
Theorem 4. Suppose that the input set of distributions falls into Case 2 of the algorithm. Then
the algorithm’s expected profit is at least 1− de ·
(
b+d−bd
d
)1/b
− γ2n , for an absolute constant γ2.
4.3 Analysis of Case 3
Suppose the set {X1, . . . ,Xn} of random variables falls into Case 3 of the algorithm. Then the
algorithm chooses α1 = · · · = αn = T , where
∫∞
T Pr[X ≥ x]dx = d and
∫ T
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx =
1− d. Consider the event that the algorithm does not pick any of the samples, and recall that its
probability is θ(n), by definition. This event happens if and only if all the samples are less than T ,
or equivalently, the maximum of the samples is less than T . Our first lemma states that this event
is not too likely.
Lemma 3. Define h = ca−1+da−1+d . Then the algorithm chooses some sample with probability at least
h, that is,
1− θ(n) = Pr[∃i Xi ≥ T ] = Pr[X ≥ T ] > h.
Proof. Since we are in Case 3, we have
∫ a
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx > ca. Recall Equation (2), which stated
that we choose a, c, and d such that ac+ d > 1. Thus,∫ T
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx = 1− d < ac <
∫ a
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx.
This implies T < a. For any x ∈ [T, a], Pr[X ≥ x] ≤ Pr[X ≥ T ]. Thus,
1− d+ (a− T ) Pr[X ≥ T ] ≥
∫ T
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx+
∫ a
T
Pr[X ≥ x]dx =
∫ a
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx > ca.
Therefore,
1− θ(n) = Pr[X ≥ T ] >
ca− 1 + d
a− T
≥
ca− 1 + d
a− 1 + d
= h
where we used the lower bound on T given by (3) for the second inequality.
Next, we bound
∑n
k=1
∫ αk
0 Pr[zk ≥ x]dx and
∑n
k=1
∫∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx from below. Substitut-
ing these lower bounds in Equation (1), we get a lower bound on the algorithm’s profit. From
Proposition 1 and recalling that αn+1 = 0, we have,
n∑
k=1
∫ αk
0
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx = α1 −
n∑
k=1
θ(k)(αk − αk+1) = T − θ(n) · T = (1− θ(n))T ≥ h(1− d) (6)
where we used Lemma 3 and Equation (3) for the last inequality.
Reusing some notation and arguments from Esfandiari et al. [7], let q−i(k) denote the probability
that the algorithm rejects the first k samples, given that none of them came from Xi. Then
Pr[zk ≥ x] =
∑n
i=1 Pr[σ(k) = i] · Pr[zk ≥ x | σ(k) = i] =
1
n
∑n
i=1 Pr[zk ≥ x | σ(k) = i]. Suppose
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x ≥ αk = T . Conditioned on σ(k) = i, the event zk ≥ x happens if and only if the following two
independent events happen: the algorithm rejects the first k−1 samples, andXi ≥ x. Thus, Pr[zk ≥
x | σ(k) = i] = q−i(k−1)·Pr[Xi ≥ x], and consequently, Pr[zk ≥ x] =
1
n
∑n
i=1 q−i(k−1)·Pr[Xi ≥ x].
Therefore,
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
x=αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx =
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
x=T
1
n
n∑
i=1
q−i(k − 1) · Pr[Xi ≥ x]dx.
Interchanging the order of summations and integration, we get,
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
x=αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx =
n∑
i=1
(
1
n
n∑
k=1
q−i(k − 1)
)
·
(∫ ∞
x=T
Pr[Xi ≥ x]dx
)
.
Define µi =
∫∞
x=T Pr[Xi ≥ x]dx, the quantity in the second pair of parentheses above. Thus,
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
x=αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx =
n∑
i=1
(
1
n
n∑
k=1
q−i(k − 1)
)
· µi.
Define Ei to be the event that the algorithm encounters Xi, that is, it does not choose a sample be-
fore it sees xi. Then observe that Pr[Ei|σ(k) = i] = q−i(k− 1), and thus, Pr[Ei] =
∑n
k=1 Pr[σ(k) =
i] · Pr[Ei|σ(k) = i] =
1
n
∑n
k=1 q−i(k − 1), the expression in the parentheses above. Therefore,
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
x=αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx =
n∑
i=1
Pr[Ei] · µi. (7)
In order to lower bound the above, we need a crucial lemma, which states that there is one
prominent random variable among {X1, . . . ,Xn} which is larger than T with a large probability,
whereas the others are unlikely to exceed T . For the rest of this section, we assume, without loss
of generality, that Pr[X1 ≥ T ] = maxi Pr[Xi ≥ T ] (that is, the prominent random variable is X1).
Lemma 4. Define g ∈ (0, 1] to be the unique2 number such that (1 − g)1/g = (1 − h)1/b. Then
Pr[X1 ≥ T ] ≥ g and
∑n
i=2 Pr[Xi ≥ T ] ≤ b− g.
The proof of Lemma 4 relies on the following technical result.
Lemma 5. Suppose y1, . . . , yn are such that 0 ≤ yi ≤ p for all i, and
∑n
i=1 yi ≤ b, where p ∈ [0, 1].
Then we have
∏n
i=1(1− yi) ≥ (1− p)
b/p.
Proof. Let (y1, . . . , yn) minimize
∏n
i=1(1 − yi) subject to the constraints 0 ≤ yi ≤ p for all i, and∑n
i=1 yi ≤ b. If np ≤ b, then it is easy to see that y1 = . . . = yn = p is the optimum. Then∏n
i=1(1− yi) = (1− p)
n ≥ (1− p)b/p, because 1− p ∈ [0, 1] and n ≤ b/p. This implies the claim.
Now suppose np > b. Then some yi must be less than p. Further,
∑n
i=1 yi must be equal to
b, otherwise we can increase one of the yis, resulting in a decrease in the objective value while
maintaining feasibility. If we have 0 < yi ≤ yj < p for some i 6= j, then we may choose an
appropriate ε > 0 and replace (yi, yj) by (yi− ε, yj + ε), thereby decreasing
∏n
i=1(1− yi) while still
maintaining feasibility, and contradicting the optimality of (y1, . . . , yn). Thus, we must have at most
one yi which is in (0, p). This forces that ⌊b/p⌋ many yis are p, one yi is b−p⌊b/p⌋ = p(b/p−⌊b/p⌋),
and the rest are zero. Thus,
n∏
i=1
(1− yi) = (1− p)
⌊b/p⌋(1− p(b/p − ⌊b/p⌋)) ≥ (1− p)⌊b/p⌋(1− p)(b/p−⌊b/p⌋) = (1− p)b/p
2Observe that ζ : (0, 1] −→ [0, 1/e) defined as ζ(z) = (1 − z)1/z is a monotonically decreasing function with
ζ(1) = 0 and limz→0 ζ(z) = 1/e. We will ensure that 0 ≤ (1− h)
1/b < 1/e, so that g exists.
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where we used the identity 1 − xz ≥ (1 − x)z for x, z ∈ [0, 1] as long as 1 − x and z are not both
zero.
As a consequence, Lemma 4 is proved as follows.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose, for contradiction, that Pr[X1 ≥ T ] = maxi Pr[Xi ≥ T ] < g. We have∑n
i=1 Pr[Xi ≥ T ] < b, otherwise the algorithm would execute Case 2 and not Case 3. Applying
Lemma 5 (with yi = Pr[Xi ≥ T ]), we have
Pr[∃i Xi ≥ T ] = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− Pr[Xi ≥ T ]) ≤ 1− (1− g)
b/g = 1− (1− h) = h.
This contradicts Lemma 3. Thus, Pr[X1 ≥ T ] ≥ g, which also implies
∑n
i=2 Pr[Xi ≥ T ] ≤ b − g,
because
∑n
i=1 Pr[Xi ≥ T ] < b.
Lemma 4 enables us to prove Lemma 6, which gives a lower bound on Pr[Ei]. Lemma 6 states
that the prominent random variable X1 is encountered with probability close to 1, whereas each
of the others is encountered with probability almost 1/2. An intuitive explanation for this is the
following. Lemma 4 states that X2, . . . ,Xn are together unlikely to cause the algorithm to stop.
Therefore, the algorithm must see X1 with probability close to one. Moreover, each other Xi
appears before X1 with probability 1/2. Given that this happens, the algorithm is unlikely to stop
before it sees Xi. Thus, Xi is seen with probability close to 1/2.
Lemma 6. Pr[E1] ≥ 1−
b−g
2 , and for i > 1, we have Pr[Ei] ≥
1
2
(
1− b−g3
)
.
Proof. Let Si = {j ∈ [n] | σ
−1(j) < σ−1(i)} ⊆ [n] \ i be the random subset of indices j whose
position is before i in the random permutation σ. Then
Pr[Ei | Si] = Pr[Xj < T ∀j ∈ Si] ≥ 1−
∑
j∈Si
Pr[Xj ≥ T ] = 1−
∑
j 6=i
Pr[Xj ≥ T ] · I[j ∈ Si] (8)
where the inequality follows by the union bound.
First, consider the case of i = 1. By (8), we have,
Pr[E1] ≥ ES1

1− n∑
j=2
Pr[Xj ≥ T ] · I[j ∈ S1]

 = 1− n∑
j=2
Pr[Xj ≥ T ] · Pr[j ∈ S1].
Every j 6= 1 is equally likely to be before 1 and after 1 in the random permutation. Thus, Pr[j ∈
S1] = 1/2. Therefore,
Pr[E1] ≥ 1−
1
2
n∑
j=2
Pr[Xj ≥ T ] ≥ 1−
b− g
2
where we used Lemma 4 for the second inequality.
Next, let i > 1. Again, by (8), we have,
Pr[Ei | 1 /∈ Si] ≥ ESi

1−∑
j 6=i
Pr[Xj ≥ T ] · I[j ∈ Si] | 1 /∈ Si


= 1−
∑
j /∈{1,i}
Pr[Xj ≥ T ] · Pr[j ∈ Si | 1 /∈ Si].
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Given 1 /∈ Si, that is, 1 is after i, it is equally likely that j /∈ {1, i} is before i, between i and 1, and
after 1, in the random permutation. Thus, Pr[j ∈ Si | 1 /∈ Si] = 1/3. Therefore,
Pr[Ei | 1 /∈ Si] ≥ 1−
1
3
∑
j /∈{1,i}
Pr[Xj ≥ T ] ≥ 1−
1
3
∑
j 6=1
Pr[Xj ≥ T ] ≥ 1−
b− g
3
where we used Lemma 4 for the last inequality. Therefore,
Pr[Ei] ≥ Pr[1 /∈ Si] · Pr[Ei | 1 /∈ Si] ≥
1
2
(
1−
b− g
3
)
as required.
Substituting the bounds given by Lemma 6 in Equation (7), we get,
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx ≥
(
1−
b− g
2
)
· µ1 +
1
2
(
1−
b− g
3
)
·
n∑
i=2
µi
=
(
1
2
−
b− g
3
)
· µ1 +
1
2
(
1−
b− g
3
)
·
n∑
i=1
µi. (9)
We are thus left to bound µ1 and
∑n
i=1 µi from below.
Lemma 7. µ1 ≥ ca− (1− d)− (a− 1 + d)(b− g).
Proof. By the union bound, we have,∫ a
T
n∑
i=1
Pr[Xi ≥ x]dx ≥
∫ a
T
Pr[X ≥ x]dx =
∫ a
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx−
∫ T
0
Pr[X ≥ x]dx.
Using the facts that
∫ a
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx > ca (else we would be in Case 1) and
∫ T
0 Pr[X ≥ x]dx = 1−d
(definition of T ), we have, ∫ a
T
n∑
i=1
Pr[Xi ≥ x]dx ≥ ca− (1− d). (10)
On the other hand, using Lemma 4 and Equation (3), we also have,∫ a
T
n∑
i=2
Pr[Xi ≥ x]dx ≤ (a− T )(b− g) ≤ (a− 1 + d)(b− g). (11)
Subtracting Equation 11 from Equation 10, we get,∫ a
T
Pr[X1 ≥ x]dx ≥ ca− (1− d)− (a− 1 + d)(b− g).
The claim follows by observing that µ1 =
∫∞
T Pr[X1 ≥ x]dx ≥
∫ a
T Pr[X1 ≥ x]dx.
Finally,
∑n
i=1 µi is easily bounded as
n∑
i=1
µi =
n∑
i=1
∫ ∞
T
Pr[Xi ≥ x]dx =
∫ ∞
T
n∑
i=1
Pr[Xi ≥ x]dx ≥
∫ ∞
T
Pr[X ≥ x]dx = d (12)
where the inequality is due to union bound.
As a result of the above analysis, we get the following bound on the competitive ratio.
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Theorem 5. Suppose that the input set of distributions falls into Case 3 of the algorithm. Then
the algorithm’s expected profit is at least
h(1− d) +
(
1
2
−
b− g
3
)
· (ca− (1− d)− (a− 1 + d)(b− g)) +
1
2
(
1−
b− g
3
)
· d.
Proof. Substituting Equation (6) and Equation (9) into Equation (1), and then using the bounds
given by Equation (12) and Lemma 7, the claim follows.
4.4 The Overall Competitive Ratio
We take a, c, d, and g as independent parameters, so that h = ca−1+da−1+d , and because (1 − g)
1/g =
(1 − h)1/b, we get that b = g ln(1 − h)/ ln(1− g). We numerically verified that for a = 1− 1.31/e,
c = 0.98, d = 0.62, and g = 0.88, we get the desired competitive ratio. It is easy to check ac+d > 1,
which we promised earlier. We get h ≈ 0.925, b ≈ 1.075, and the competitive ratio lower bounds
given by Theorems 3, 4, and 5 are all at least c∗ − O(n−1), for some c∗ > 1 − 1/e + 1/400. It
remains to show how the O(n−1) term can be eliminated.
Lemma 8. If there exists a c-competitive algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem with N
random variables, then there exists a c-competitive algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem
with n random variables for every n < N .
Proof. Let ALG(N) denote the algorithm. The required algorithm ALG(n) behaves as follows.
Given n random variables X1, . . . ,Xn, it adds N − n ghost random variables Xn+1, . . . ,XN which
take value zero deterministically. This does not change the expectation of the maximum. We now
argue that ALG(n) can essentially simulate the behavior of ALG(N). Given a permutation σ of
[n], we can generate a permutation σ′ of [N ] as follows. Arrange n+1, . . . , N uniformly at random
in N − n out of N locations, then place 1, . . . , n in the n vacant locations in the order specified by
σ. If σ is a uniformly random permutation of [n], then σ′ is a uniformly random permutation of
[N ]. ALG(n) uses this trick as follows. First it places the ghost random variables into N − n out
of N locations, and starts running ALG(N). As soon as it encounters a vacant location, it asks
for the next real input, and passes it on to ALG(N). Clearly, since ALG(N) is c-competitive, so is
ALG(n).
It is instructive to simplify the working of ALG(n). Given the sequence of thresholds α1, . . . , αN
chosen by ALG(N), ALG(n) essentially chooses a random subsequence of n thresholds and uses
them. Clearly, since the algorithm is c-competitive on an average, there exists a subsequence of
α1, . . . , αN with n thresholds which achieves c-competitiveness.
Corollary 1. If there exists an algorithm with competitive ratio c−O(n−1) for the Prophet Secretary
problem on n random variables, then for any ε > 0 there exists a (c− ε)-competitive algorithm for
the Prophet Secretary problem.
Proof. Given an instance of the Prophet Secretary problem on n random variables, choose N large
enough so that the O(N−1) term in the competitive ratio is less than ε, and apply Lemma 8.
As a consequence of the above corollary, we have an algorithm for the Prophet Secretary problem
with competitive ratio c∗ − ε for every ε > 0. Since c∗ > 1− 1/e + 1/400, Theorem 1 follows.
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5 A Hardness Result for Distribution-Insensitive Algorithms
Recall the definition of a deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithm from Section 2: such an
algorithm chooses its thresholds α1, . . . , αn deterministically merely with the knowledge of the
expected value of the maximum of the random variables, which we assumed to be one. Therefore,
the adversary may adapt the input set of random variables to the algorithm subject to keeping
the expectation of their maximum to be one. We now give an adversarial strategy which forces
an upper bound of 11/15 on the competitive ratio of any deterministic distribution-insensitive
algorithm ALG. This proves Theorem 2.
Let n = 3, and let α1, α2, α3 be the thresholds chosen by a deterministic distribution-insensitive
algorithm ALG. Without loss of generality, we assume α3 = 0, because if the algorithm does not
pick any of the first two samples, then it can only benefit by picking the last one, no matter how
small it is. Depending on the values of α1 and α2, the adversary chooses one of the following
instances as input to the algorithm, where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
• Instance 1: X1 is 1 deterministically; X2 and X3 are both 0 deterministically.
• Instance 2: X1 is 1 deterministically; X2 and X3 are both α1 deterministically.
• Instance 3: X1 is (1− (1−ε)(α1−ε))/ε with probability ε and α1−ε with probability 1−ε;
X2 and X3 are both α2 deterministically. (This instance is used only if α1 > α2.)
• Instance 4: X1 is (1 − (1 − ε)(min(α1, α2) − ε))/ε with probability ε and min(α1, α2) − ε
with probability 1− ε; X2 and X3 are both 0 deterministically. (This instance is used only if
min(α1, α2) > 0.)
Observe that for each of the instances above, E[maxiXi] = E[X1] = 1. In order to prove an upper
bound on the competitive ratio of ALG, we first consider the case where one of α1 and α2 is larger
than 1, and analyze the algorithm’s performance on Instance 1.
Lemma 9. If α1 > 1 or α2 > 1, then the competitive ratio of ALG is no larger than 2/3.
Proof. Consider Instance 1, where X1 is 1 deterministically, and X2 and X3 are both 0 determin-
istically. Suppose α1 > 1. Then ALG misses X1 with probability at least 1/3, so the expectation
of its profit is at most 2/3. The same argument holds if α2 > 1.
We therefore assume for the rest of this section that both α1 and α2 are at most 1. In the next
three lemmas, we analyze the algorithm’s performance on Instances 2-4, each resulting in an upper
bound on the algorithm’s competitive ratio as a function of α1 and α2. Then we argue that the
minimum of the three bounds is at most 11/15 for any choice of α1 and α2.
Lemma 10. The competitive ratio of ALG is no larger than (1 + 2α1)/3.
Proof. Consider Instance 2, where X1 is 1 deterministically, and X2 and X3 are both α1 determin-
istically. ALG necessarily accepts the first sample, because all the random variables are at least α1
with probability one. With probability 1/3, X1 appears first and ALG’s profit is 1, whereas with
probability 2/3, one of X2 and X3 comes first, resulting in the ALG’s profit being α1. Thus, the
expectation of ALG’s profit is (1 + 2α1)/3.
Lemma 11. If α1 > α2, then the competitive ratio of ALG is no larger than (2− α1 + 2α2)/3.
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Proof. Consider Instance 3, where X1 is (1− (1− ε)(α1 − ε))/ε with probability ε and α1− ε with
probability 1 − ε, whereas both X2 and X3 are α2 deterministically. Suppose X1 appears first.
If its value is realized to be (1 − (1 − ε)(α1 − ε))/ε, then the algorithm picks it; otherwise the
algorithm picks α2 in the next round. Suppose X1 appears second. Then the first sample, which is
necessarily α2, is rejected, and since X1 ≥ α2 with probability one, the algorithm picks whatever
value is realized for X1. If X1 appears last, then the algorithm rejects the first sample, which is
α2, and accepts the second one, which is also α2. Thus, the expected profit of the algorithm is
1
3
·
(
ε ·
1− (1− ε)(α1 − ε)
ε
+ (1− ε) · α2
)
+
1
3
·E[X1]+
1
3
·α2 =
1
3
·(1−(1−ε)(α1−ε−α2)+1+α2).
As ε→ 0, this approaches (2− α1 + 2α2)/3.
Lemma 12. If min(α1, α2) = α > 0, then the competitive ratio of ALG is no larger than (3−2α)/3.
Proof. Consider Instance 4, where X1 is (1 − (1 − ε)(α − ε))/ε with probability ε and α − ε with
probability 1 − ε, whereas both X2 and X3 are 0 deterministically. If X1 appears first or second,
then the algorithm picks it if and only if its realized value is (1− (1− ε)(α− ε))/ε. If X1 appears
last, then the algorithm picks it irrespective of its realized value. Thus, the expected profit of the
algorithm is
2
3
·
(
ε ·
1− (1− ε)(α − ε)
ε
)
+
1
3
· E[X1] =
1
3
· (2− 2(1 − ε)(α − ε) + 1).
As ε→ 0, this approaches (3− 2α)/3.
The above lemmas allow us to prove Theorem 2 as follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, suppose α1 > α2 > 0. Then by Lemmas 10, 11, and 12, the competitive
ratio of the algorithm is at most
min(1 + 2α1, 2− α1 + 2α2, 3− 2α2)
3
≤
1× (1 + 2α1) + 2× (2− α1 + 2α2) + 2× (3− 2α2)
(1 + 2 + 2)× 3
=
11
15
.
Next, suppose α1 > α2 = 0. Then by Lemmas 10 and 11, the competitive ratio of the algorithm is
at most
min(1 + 2α1, 2− α1)
3
≤
1× (1 + 2α1) + 2× (2− α1)
(1 + 2)× 3
=
5
9
<
11
15
.
On the other hand, if 0 < α1 ≤ α2, then by Lemmas 10 and 12, the competitive ratio of the
algorithm is at most
min(1 + 2α1, 3− 2α1)
3
≤
1 + 2α1 + 3− 2α1
6
=
2
3
<
11
15
.
Finally, if 0 = α1 ≤ α2, then by Lemma 10, the competitive ratio of the algorithm is at most
1/3 < 11/15.
6 Concluding Remarks
Our understanding of the Prophet Secretary problem is still limited, and there is a lot of scope for
diving deeper. We showed that 1−1/e is not the correct competitive ratio for the Prophet Secretary
problem. Under the natural restriction of deterministic distribution-insensitivity, we showed that
no algorithm can have competitive ratio larger than 11/15. We conjecture that none of the bounds
known bounds for the Prophet Secretary problem is tight. As this is a fundamental problem, finding
the right competitive ratio is an important question which is still wide open.
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A Proofs omitted from Section 4
One claim which we will use repeatedly in this section is the following.
Lemma 13. For x ≥ 0, 0 ≤ 1− e−x ≤ x and 0 ≤ 1− (1 + x)e−x ≤ x2.
Proof. The lower bound on 1 − e−x is obvious. The lower bound on 1 − (1 + x)e−x follows easily
from the fact that 1 + x ≤ ex. Since 1− x ≤ e−x, we have 1− e−x ≤ x. Multiplying this by 1 + x,
which is positive, we get 1+ x− (1+ x)e−x ≤ x2+ x, that is, 1− (1 + x)e−x ≤ x2, as required.
A.1 Proofs omitted from the analysis of Case 1
Let τ = ⌊n(1 + ln(1 − a)) + 1⌋. Our next lemma states the asymptotic behavior of certain error
terms which appear in the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 14. Suppose α1 . . . , αn are defined as in Case 1 of the algorithm. Then there exists absolute
positive constants, γ>1 , γ
=
1 , γ
<
1 , such that
1. For k > τ , 1−αkn − αk + αk+1 ≥ −
γ>1
n2
.
2. For k = τ , 1−cαkn − αk + αk+1 ≥ −
γ=1
n .
3. For k < τ , 1−cαkn − αk + αk+1 ≥ −
γ<1
n2 .
Proof. For k > τ , we have
1− αk
n
− αk + αk+1 =
e(k−1)/n−1
n
+ e(k−1)/n−1 − ek/n−1 = −ek/n−1
(
−e−1/n
(
1
n
+ 1
)
+ 1
)
.
Using Lemma 13 for the expression in the parenthesis and using k ≤ n, we have,
1− αk
n
− αk + αk+1 ≥ −
ek/n−1
n2
≥ −
1
n2
= −
γ>1
n2
where γ>1 = 1.
For k = τ , we have
1− cαk
n
− αk + αk+1 =
(1− ca)
n
·
(
e(k−1)/n−1
1− a
)c
−
1
c
+
(
1
c
− a
)(
e(k−1)/n−1
1− a
)c
+ 1− ek/n−1
=
(
1
c
− a
)(
e(k−1)/n−1
1− a
)c ( c
n
+ 1
)
−
1
c
+ 1− ek/n−1.
Since n(1 + ln(1 − a)) < k = τ ≤ n(1 + ln(1 − a)) + 1, we have e(k−1)/n−1 = ek/n−1/n−1 ≥
e1+ln(1−a) · e−1−1/n = (1 − a) · e−1/n, and ek/n−1 ≤ eln(1−a)+1/n = (1 − a)e1/n. Substituting these
bounds above, we get
1− cαk
n
− αk + αk+1 ≥
(
1
c
− a
)
e−c/n
( c
n
+ 1
)
−
1
c
+ 1− (1− a)e1/n
=
e−c/n
c
( c
n
+ 1
)
− ae−c/n
( c
n
+ 1
)
−
1
c
+ 1− (1− a)e1/n
= −
1
c
(
−e−c/n
( c
n
+ 1
)
+ 1
)
+ a
(
1− e−c/n
( c
n
+ 1
))
− (1− a)(e1/n − 1).
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Using Lemma 13 and the fact that 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, we have,
1− cαk
n
− αk + αk+1 ≥ −
1
c
·
c2
n2
−
(1− a)e1/n
n
≥ −
c
n
−
(1− a)e
n
= −
c+ (1− a)e
n
= −
γ=1
n
where γ=1 = c+ (1− a)e.
For k < τ , we have
1− cαk
n
− αk + αk+1 =
(1− ca)
n
·
(
e(k−1)/n−1
1− a
)c
+
(
1
c
− a
)(
e(k−1)/n−1
1− a
)c
−
(
1
c
− a
)(
ek/n−1
1− a
)c
= −
(
1
c
− a
)(
ek/n−1
1− a
)c (
−e−c/n
( c
n
+ 1
)
+ 1
)
.
Using Lemma 13 and using the facts k ≤ n and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 ≤ 1/c, we have,
1− cαk
n
− αk + αk+1 ≥ −
(
1
c
− a
)
·
1
(1− a)c
·
c2
n2
= −
γ<1
n2
where γ<1 = (1/c − a) · (1− a)
−c.
Proof of Theorem 3. We have
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx =
τ∑
k=1
∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx+
n∑
k=τ+1
∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx
≥
τ∑
k=1
θ(k) ·
1− cαk
n
+
n∑
k=τ+1
θ(k) ·
1− αk
n
.
Here we used Lemma 1 for the first term and Proposition 2 for the second term. Substituting this
and the bound of Proposition 1 in Equation (1), we get
ALG ≥ α1 +
τ∑
k=1
θ(k) ·
(
1− cαk
n
− αk + αk+1
)
+
n∑
k=τ+1
θ(k) ·
(
1− αk
n
− αk + αk+1
)
.
Using Lemma 14 and the fact that θ(k) ≤ 1, we have,
ALG ≥ α1 −
τ−1∑
k=1
θ(k) ·
γ<1
n2
− θ(τ) ·
γ=1
n
−
n∑
k=τ+1
θ(k) ·
γ>1
n2
≥ α1 −
γ<1 + γ
=
1 + γ
>
1
n
=
1
c
−
(
1
c
− a
)
(e(1 − a))−c −
γ1
n
where γ1 = γ
<
1 + γ
=
1 + γ
>
1 .
A.2 Proofs omitted from the analysis of Case 2
Let τ =
⌊
n
(
1− 1b ln
b+d−bd
d
)
+ 1
⌋
. Our next lemma states the asymptotic behavior of certain error
terms which appear in the proof of Theorem 4.
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Lemma 15. Suppose α1 . . . , αn are defined as in Case 2 of the algorithm. Then there exists absolute
positive constants, γ>2 , γ
=
2 , γ
<
2 , such that
1. For k < τ , 1−αkn − αk + αk+1 ≥ −
γ<2
n2 .
2. For k = τ , 1−αkn − αk + αk+1 ≥ −
γ=2
n .
3. For k > τ , b+d−bd−bαkn − αk + αk+1 ≥ −
γ>2
n2
.
Proof. For k < τ , we have
1− αk
n
− αk + αk+1 = d ·
(
b+ d− bd
d
)1/b
·
(
e(k−1)/n−1
n
+ e(k−1)/n−1 − ek/n−1
)
= −d ·
(
b+ d− bd
d
)1/b
· ek/n−1 ·
(
−e−1/n
(
1
n
+ 1
)
+ 1
)
.
Using Lemma 13 and the fact that k ≤ n, we have,
1− αk
n
− αk + αk+1 ≥ −d ·
(
b+ d− bd
d
)1/b
·
1
n2
= −
γ<2
n2
where γ<2 = d((b+ d+ bd)/d)
1/b.
For k = τ , we have
1−
1
b
ln
b+ d− bd
d
<
k
n
≤ 1−
1
b
ln
b+ d− bd
d
+
1
n
.
Thus,
1− αk
n
− αk =
d
n
(
b+ d− bd
d
)1/b
e(k−1)/n−1 − 1 + d
(
b+ d− bd
d
)1/b
e(k−1)/n−1
= d
(
b+ d− bd
d
)1/b
e(k−1)/n−1
(
1
n
+ 1
)
− 1
≥ de−1/n
(
1
n
+ 1
)
− 1 (13)
where we used the lower bound on k/n in the inequality. We also have,
αk+1 = (1− e
b(k/n−1))
b+ d− bd
b
≥
(
1−
deb/n
b+ d− bd
)
b+ d− bd
b
=
b+ d− bd
b
−
deb/n
b
= 1 +
d
b
− d−
deb/n
b
(14)
where we used the upper bound on k/n in the inequality. Adding (13) and (14),
1− αk
n
− αk + αk+1 ≥ de
−1/n
(
1
n
+ 1
)
+
d
b
− d−
deb/n
b
≥ −d
(
−e−1/n
(
1
n
+ 1
)
+ 1
)
−
deb/n
b
(1− e−b/n).
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Using Lemma 13, we have,
1− αk
n
− αk + αk+1 ≥ −
d
n2
−
deb/n
b
·
b
n
≥ −
d
n
−
deb
n
= −
d(1 + eb)
n
= −
γ=2
n
where γ=2 = d(1 + e
b).
For k > τ , we have
b+ d− bd− bαk
n
=
(b+ d− bd) · eb((k−1)/n−1)
n
,
αk+1 − αk = (e
b((k−1)/n−1) − eb(k/n−1)) ·
b+ d− bd
b
=
b+ d− bd
b
· eb((k−1)/n−1) · (1− eb/n).
Adding the above two equations, we get,
b+ d− bd− bαk
n
− αk + αk+1 =
b+ d− bd
b
· eb((k−1)/n−1) ·
(
b
n
+ 1− eb/n
)
= −
b+ d− bd
b
· eb(k/n−1) ·
(
−eb/n
(
b
n
+ 1
)
+ 1
)
.
Using Lemma 13 and the fact that k ≤ n, we have,
b+ d− bd− bαk
n
− αk + αk+1 ≥ −
b+ d− bd
b
·
b2
n2
= −
b(b+ d− bd)
n2
= −
γ>2
n2
where γ>2 = b(b+ d− bd).
Proof of Theorem 4. We have
n∑
k=1
∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx =
τ∑
k=1
∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx+
n∑
k=τ+1
∫ ∞
αk
Pr[zk ≥ x]dx
≥
τ∑
k=1
θ(k) ·
1− αk
n
+
n∑
k=τ+1
θ(k) ·
b+ d− bd− bαk
n
.
Here we used Proposition 2 for the first term and Lemma 2 for the second term. Substituting this
and the bound of Proposition 1 in Equation (1), we get
ALG ≥ α1 +
τ∑
k=1
θ(k) ·
(
1− αk
n
− αk + αk+1
)
+
n∑
k=τ+1
θ(k) ·
(
b+ d− bd− bαk
n
− αk + αk+1
)
.
Using Lemma 15 and the fact that θ(k) ≤ 1, we have,
ALG ≥ α1 −
τ−1∑
k=1
θ(k) ·
γ<2
n2
− θ(τ) ·
γ=2
n
−
n∑
k=τ+1
θ(k) ·
γ>2
n2
≥ α1 −
γ<2 + γ
=
2 + γ
>
2
n
= 1−
d
e
(
b+ d− bd
d
)1/b
−
γ2
n
where γ2 = γ
<
2 + γ
=
2 + γ
>
2 .
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B The IID Prophet Inequality
Hill and Kertz [10] analyzed the optimal dynamic programming algorithm for the IID Prophet
Inequality problem, and characterized its competitive ratio implicitly as follows.
Definition 1. For each n > 1, the function φn : [0,∞) × [0,∞) −→ R is defined as
φn(w, x) =
n
n− 1
w(n−1)/n +
x
n− 1
.
For each n > 1 and j = 0, . . . , n− 1, the function ηj,n : [0,∞) −→ R is defined recursively as
η0,n(α) = φn(0, α),
ηj,n(α) = φn(ηj−1,n(α), α).
With the above definition, Hill and Kertz proved the following claim on the competitive ratio
for the IID Prophet Inequality.
Claim 1 (Theorem A of Hill and Kertz [10]). There is a unique αn > 0 for which ηn−1,n(αn) = 1.
Furthermore, the competitive ratio for the Prophet Inequality with n IID random variables is exactly
ciid(n) = (1 + αn)
−1.
Hill and Kertz managed to determine the value of ciid(n) with a reasonable accuracy for n ≤
10000, for instance, they found that α10000 ≈ 0.341, implying ciid ≤ ciid(10000) ≈ 1/1.341 < 0.746.
However, for larger n, they only proved a (weak) lower bound of 1− 1/e on ciid(n).
Recently, Correa et al. [4], while analyzing posted price mechanisms for a randomly arranged
sequence of customers, also showed that their techniques result in an algorithm for the IID Prophet
Inequality. They gave the following implicitly defined bound on its competitive ratio.
Claim 2 (Correa et al. [4]3). There exists a unique sequence x0, . . . , xn such that x0 = 1, xn = 0,
and for every i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
xni−1
n
−
xni
n
=
xn−1i
n− 1
−
xn−1i+1
n− 1
.
Furthermore, the competitive ratio of Correa et al.’s algorithm for the Prophet Inequality with n
IID random variables is at least ccfhov(n) = (n(1− x
n−1
1 ))
−1.
Correa et al. also proved ccfhov = infn ccfhov(n) > 0.745. Together with the upper bound on ciid,
we immediately have 0.745 < ccfhov ≤ ciid < 0.746, which means that ccfhov and ciid are already
very close. Surprisingly, they are, in fact, equal.
Claim 3. For all n > 1, ccfhov(n) = ciid(n). Hence, ccfhov = ciid.
Proof. An equivalent way of defining the functions ηj,n is the following. η−1,n(α) = 0 and ηj,n(α) =
φn(ηj−1,n(α), α) for j = 0, . . . , n− 1. For any j = 0, . . . , n− 2 and any α, we have,
ηj,n(α) =
n
n− 1
(ηj−1,n(α))
(n−1)/n +
α
n− 1
, (15)
ηj+1,n(α) =
n
n− 1
(ηj,n(α))
(n−1)/n +
α
n− 1
.
3Correa et al. do not state this as an explicit theorem. However, they mention essentially this in the section with
the heading “Bounding α1 through a recursion”.
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Subtracting, we get, for any j = 0, . . . , n− 2 and any α,
ηj+1,n(α)
n
−
ηj,n(α)
n
=
(ηj,n(α))
(n−1)/n
n− 1
−
(ηj−1,n(α))
(n−1)/n
n− 1
. (16)
Let yi = (ηn−1−i,n(αn))
1/n for i = 0, . . . , n − 1, and yn = 0. Then y0 = (ηn−1,n(αn))
1/n = 1,
because ηn−1,n(αn) = 1, by definition of αn. Also, by Equation (16), we have
yni−1
n
−
yni
n
=
yn−1i
n− 1
−
yn−1i+1
n− 1
.
Thus, by Claim 2, xi = yi for all i. Also, substituting j = n− 1 and α = αn in Equation (15), we
get,
1 = ηn−1,n(αn) =
n
n− 1
(ηn−2,n(αn))
(n−1)/n +
αn
n− 1
.
Thus,
yn−11 = (ηn−2,n(αn))
(n−1)/n =
n− 1− αn
n
,
that is,
1− yn−11 =
1 + αn
n
.
Therefore,
ccfhov(n) =
1
n(1− xn−11 )
=
1
n(1− yn−11 )
=
1
1 + αn
= ciid(n).
This means that Correa et al.’s algorithm also achieves the optimal competitive ratio for IID
Prophet Inequality. However, while the optimal dynamic programming algorithm is guaranteed to
achieve the largest possible profit on every input, it is unclear whether Correa et al.’s algorithm
has this property.
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